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Abstract
This thesis examines the labor policies and practices of the Bethlehem Steel
Corporation, specifically, the Employees' Representation Plan created in 1918.
Essentially, this plan served as a company union, common from 1918 to the later 1930s
throughout industry and manufacturing. A centerpiece in communicating the advantages
of this plan was The Bethlehem Review. Eugene G. Grace, president of the Bethlehem
Steel Corporation, used The Bethlehem Review to attempt to forestall the unionization
campaign that occurred in the steel industry during the middle to late 1930s. Essentially,
Grace made the company newsletter into his own forum for anti-union propaganda and
for relating the advantages of The Bethlehem Plan of Employees' Representation to the
Bethlehem Steel workforce specifically and the steel industry generally.
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Foreword
For most of the twentieth century Bethlehem Steel was the second largest steel
maker in America but was still much smaller than the gigantic U.S. Steel.
Notwithstanding its distinction as the largest of the "Little Steel" companies, the
importance of Bethlehem Steel was anything but diminutive. 1 As stated in The
Bethlehem Review, the company was founded on "the idea of supplying commercial steel
to the rapidly growing market in the eastern section of the United States.,,2 Without a
doubt, Bethlehem Steel fulfilled this vision. Throughout its history Bethlehem produced
steel for armaments and battleships during both World Wars, while supplying a
significant portion of the structural steel used to create the distinctive skyline of New
York City. Some of Bethlehem's most prestigious projects included the Golden Gate
Bridge, the George Washington Bridge, Rockefeller Plaza, the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel,
the Chicago Merchandise Mart, and the U.S. Supreme Court building. Bethlehem Steel
products were not limited to armaments or buildings. Other Bethlehem products
included small items such as steel springs, razors, suspender buttons, and iron nails. 3
Certainly, Bethlehem Steel and its workforce played an important role in the
development of twentieth century America. Bethlehem also was a trend-setter
concerning labor relations, specifically during the push for company unions and
employee representation plans after World War 1.
I The four companies known collectively as "Little Steel" were Republic Steel, Inland Steel,
Bethlehem Steel, and Youngstown Sheet and Tube.
2 Eugene G. Grace, "Bethlehem's Twentieth Birthday," The Bethlehem Review 5 (December 10,
1924), 1.
3 Bethlehem Steel Corporation, "An American's Contact with Bethlehem Products," The
Bethlehem Review 3 (September 8, 1924),4.
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Today, however, the once bustling South Bethlehem plant is an industrial
graveyard of rusting metal that is now giving way to the new BethWorks Casino
currently under construction. In fitting irony, the contractors must bring in steel to the
former plant from one of Bethlehem's former domestic competitors, Nucor.4 Numerous
factors, both those under the control of Bethlehem's management and those influencing
the entire steel industry, toppled Bethlehem from its lofty position.
4 Matt Assad, "Cast in Steel and Irony," The Morning Call, 6 February 2008, sec. B, 1-2.
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Introduction
The origins ofBethlehem Steel date to 1857, when in South Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania, the Saucona Iron Company was established. From this point South
Bethlehem was synonymous with iron and later steel production. On December 10,
1904, Charles M. Schwab founded the modern Bethlehem Steel Corporation. Schwab
brought an extensive knowledge of the steel industry to Bethlehem. From 1901 to 1903,
before arriving at Bethlehem, he had been president of the United States Steel
Corporation. l Under his direction the old Bethlehem company grew into a significant
national corporation. As a result of Schwab's business acumen, the physical plant of
Bethlehem Steel expanded. After his arrival, Bethlehem's plants included the main steel
plant in South Bethlehem, iron ore mines in Cuba and shipbuilding facilities ofthe Union
Iron Works in California, and Harlan and Hollingsworth in Delaware.2
This study concentrates on Bethlehem Steel from 1918 to 1941. It is during this
period that Bethlehem's industrial capacity and influence grew. At the same time, the
company engaged in controversial labor practices. Historically, the entire steel industry
had vehemently resisted any form of labor organization. In a 1918 article "Democracy in
Bethlehem," The New Republic claimed, "the steel industry has been like a great island
fortified against the rising flood of trade unionism.") Bethlehem Steel was not alone.
Throughout the entire industry the open-shop policy found strong support among
management. The open-shop concept, touted by management and strongly resisted by
I Bethlehem Steel, A BriefHistOly ofBethlehem Steel COIporatioll (Bethlehem: Bethlehem Steel
Corporation, 1992), 1.
2 Ibid., 1.
3 "Democracy in Bethlehem," The New Republic 16 (August 10, 1918), 38.
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labor, meant that each worker individually contracted to work for the company; unions
could not bargain collectively for its members. Eventually, management identified the
open-shop policy as the "American Plan." Eugene Grace, president ofBethlehem Steel
from 1916 to 1945, strongly supported the open-shop policy. Grace ardently resisted the
introduction of an outside labor union at any of Bethlehem's plants. Steel executives did
not want labor dictating demands to them; they wanted total control over their workers.
In 1918, with labor discontent mounting in other industries, the management of
Bethlehem Steel initiated an Employees' Representation Plan (ERP), or as it was known
throughout the entire steel industry, the Bethlehem Plan. The larger purpose of the ERP,
as publicly announced, was to create a two-way system of communication'between the
management and the employees. The management of Bethlehem, however, actually
designed and promoted the ERP in response to growing labor unrest, as an alternative to
independent labor unions gaining in popularity across the country, and most importantly,
as the result of a mandate from the Federal War Labor Board during the First World War.
After initiating the ERP, management realized the need to communicate the
benefits of the plan to the employees.4 The management of Bethlehem Steel found such
a public relations tool in the Bethlehem Review.5 Initially, management used the Review
as one form of communication with the employees, also bringing them the latest news at
Bethlehem. This public relations tool, however, had a second, underlying purpose. As
the unionization campaign intensified during the 1930s, the Review became Grace's
means of championing the benefits of the Bethlehem Plan, allowing management to take
4 Initially, The Bethlehem Booster served as a company publication for Bethlehem Steel
beginning in 1918-1919.
5 For purposes of simplicity, The Bethlehem Review will henceforth be referred to as the Review.
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the offensive against unions.6 Management throughout the steel industry, not just at
Bethlehem, utilized programs similar to Bethlehem's ERP to resist unionization.
Principally, the Review was an opinion-shaping tool for Eugene Grace and the
senior management of Bethlehem Steel. The language utilized in the Review revealed the
company's intent to fend Off unionization. To achieve this end, management used
carefully constructed language that became manipulative as the unionization campaign
spread across the nation in the 1930s. This study demonstrates that the management of
Bethlehem Steel attempted to shape workers' attitudes concerning the ERP through the
Review. Thus, the Review was a tool of management to convince the rank-and-fi1e
laborer that the Bethlehem ERP, and not an outside union, met the collective needs of
labor.
6 Melvyn Dubofsky, Industrialism and the American Worker: 1865-1920 Third Edition
(Wheeling,IL: Harlan Davidson, 1996), 148.
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Part I: The Man Behind the Steel: Eugene G. Grace
Fittingly, the education that elevated Grace into his position at Bethlehem Steel
began in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. Born August 27, 1876, in Cape May, New Jersey,
Grace graduated in 1899 as valedictorian of his class at Lehigh University with a degree
in electrical engineering. Although Grace rose to the highest position at Bethlehem in a
relatively short time, his first job as an electric crane operator paid sixty dollars a month.
Two years later he earned $100 a month working in the open hearth department. By
November 1902, his salary had tripled to $180 a month as yard superintendent.? These
jobs, however, enabled him to polish his skills and drive to succeed in business,
something Charles Schwab quickly noticed. As he stated to the American Iron and Steel
Institute CAISI) during the presentation of the Gary Medal to Eugene Grace, "These years
in the mill, however, were invaluable to the young man, because they gave him an
appreciation of the problems of the men, which he has never forgotten.,,8
Grace was not afraid to attempt new and challenging projects. At the relatively
young age of twenty-nine, he oversaw the expansion of Bethlehem's iron ore mines in
Cuba, a significant project for the corporation. In all his assignments, Eugene Grace
exhibited natural leadership skills and an intense drive to succeed at everything he
attempted. This drive eventually earned him the reputation of"Mr. Steel."g
Grace was a protege of Charles Schwab who followed the industry's anti-union
7 For more on the early positions held by Grace, see The Johnston Papers, Hagley Museum and
Library, Soda House.
8 Charles Schwab, Year Book a/the American Iron and Steel Institute (New York: American
Iron and Steel Institute, 1934), 132.
9 Elizabeth C. Sholes and Thomas E. Leary, "Eugene G. Grace," The Encyclopedia ofAmericall
Business HistOlY and Biography: The 11'011 and Steel111dustlY in the Twentieth Centwy (Michigan:
Bruccoli Clark Layman, 1994), 173. .
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doctrines. Schwab's doctrine toward workers was, "we will discuss matters, but we
never vote."IO As head of the corporation, Schwab always had the final say in every
matter. He passed the aforementioned "Schwab Doctrine of Labor" on to his managers,
including Eugene Grace. I1 Thus, both men had no use for organized labor. Schwab
attributed similar sentiments to Grace during a 1934 speech to the AISI. According to
Schwab, Grace "opposed various attempts at labor dictatorship" and "upheld the open
shop" policy.12 For example, in December 1, 1920, Grace publicly refused to sell
fabricated steel to union builders and contractors working in New York City and
Philadelphia. According to Grace he was merely upholding the open-shop policy. He
testified before a/egislative committee that "I think it is a proper thing to protect the
open shop princi~e,"13 Although Grace said this was solely in the public interest, it
demonstrates his strong anti-union policy.14 Grace did not worry about the possible
repercussions of this stance. Had Grace sold steel to organized labor, to him it would
have served as recognition of the important role of organized labor in the steel industry.
Such a position actually reflects the depth of his hostility to organized labor since it stood
to hurt Bethlehem Steel economically. The New York World quoted Grace in the 1920s
as saying that "all the steel interests of the country are endeavoring to kill off union labor
10 David Brody, Labor in Crisis: The Steel Strike of1919 (New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1965),86.
II Frank Whelan, "Steel's History is also Labor's History," The Morning Call, 22 October 1995,
sec. A, p. 2. For more on Charles Schwab see, Robert Hessen, Steel Titan: The Life ofCharles M.
Schwab (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).
12 Schwab, Yearbook ofthe American Iron and Steel Institute, 134.
13 "Plot Against Unions as Gompers Sees It," The New York Times, 17 September 1922, p. 90.
14 Philip Taft, Organized Labor in American HistOly (New York: Harper & Row, 1964),364.
As Grace pushed for the open-shop policy, labor desired the closed-shop policy or "the right ofcollective
bargaining through labor union leaders." Elbert H. Gary, "Present Industrial Issues," The American Review
ofReviews 60 (1920): 488.
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and create non-union shops.,,15
Grace also used his speeches as President of the AISI to state his adherence to the
open shop policy. Although this entire group upheld the open shop concept, these
speeches still provide evidence of Grace's anti-union philosophies. In 1935, Grace stated
that "we stand squarely for the open shop. We know this to be for the best interests of
employees, employers, and the general public.,,16 Years later, during the Second World
War, Grace reiterated his strong anti-union beliefs in his testimony before the National
War Labor Board (NWLB). Concerning unions and a wage increase, Grace testified that
both were "unsound and dangerous," and steel executives, therefore, could not "assume
or accept any responsibility for the evil consequences that we [management] fear will
follow.,,17
Eugene Grace also fiercely opposed government intervention in business. In
"Industry and The Public" Grace claimed, "The framers of our Constitution recognized
the dangers in political control of our economic life. They wisely provided checks and
balances on power delegated and divided the legislative, executive and judicial branches
of our Government."18 Here, Grace claimed that the system of checks and balances
prevents government intervention in business by giving each branch a constitutionally
defined function, none of which pertained to business regulation. This was certainly
15 Eugene Grace as quoted in Adrian A. Paradis, Labor in Action: The StOlY ofthe American
Labor Movement (New York: Julian Messner, 1965),70. There was no specific date for this quotation in
either the text or the notes. However, based on the surrounding material, it is evident that Grace made this
statement during the 1920s.
16 Eugene G. Grace, "The President's Address," Yearbook ofthe American Iron and Steel
Institute (New York: American Iron and Steel Institute, 1935),37-38.
17 Eugene G. Grace, "Statement of E.G. Grace Regarding The 'Little Steel' Cases Before
National War Labor Board," (1942) (photocopy), 1, Harold J. Ruttenberg Collection, Penn State
University, Historical Collections and Labor Achieves, Special Collections Department.
18 Eugene G. Grace, "Industry and The Public," Year Book ofthe American Iron and Steel
Institute (New York: American Iron and Steel Institute, 1936), 31.
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weak commentary on American Government. The one exception to Grace's opposition
was protective tariffs that actually helped Bethlehem.
Abiding by laissez1aire doctrines, "Grace sought to preserve Bethlehem's
autonomy over its choice regarding labor relations.,,19 Thus, labor matters were to be
decided by Bethlehem Steel executives, not the Steel Workers' Organizing Committee
(SWOC) leaders. During his 1935 "President's Address" to the AISI, Grace discussed
his dislike of government intervention in business and the economy. As Grace observed,
"the talent necessary to direct the private business activity ofthis nation is not found in
Government. ,,20 Steel executives did not want anyone else determining their business
activities. Although this is not especially surprising for someone in Grace's position,
such ideas served as the foundation for his contempt for labor unions. Such ideologies
harken back to the aforementioned "Schwab Doctrine of Labor." Grace and the senior
management of Bethlehem Steel wanted no concessions of power to any group of
laborers.
It should come as no surprise then that the Great Depression put Grace and the
United States government squarely at odds with each other. Franklin D. Roosevelt's
New Deal legislation, created in response to the worsening economic depression
crippling the nation during the 1930s, challenged Grace's views concerning the
government's role in industry.21 Although Grace did acknowledge that a relationship
\9 Sholes, "Eugene G. Grace," 174.
20 Eugene G. Grace, "The President's Address," 36.
2\ According to Robert Zeiger, "Roosevelt's victory stiffened the resolve of SWOC organizers in
scores of mill towns." Without a doubt, Bethlehem Steel and the city of Bethlehem experienced this as
well. Zeiger continues by claiming the LaFollette Commission, created to investigate antilabor
corporations, essentially gave labor the sense that the government of the United States supported their
organizing efforts. See Zeiger, American Workers, American Unions, 48.
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should exist between the government and business, he believed that the New Deal
legislation went too far. 22 Specifically, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and
the Wagner Act of 1935 challenged Grace's views of the government's role in industry.23
A huge gain for labor was the Wagner Act that required companies to accept
unionization if the majority of employees voted to join a union.24 Also, the Wagner Act
outlawed company unions.25 This put the Bethlehem ERP in a very uncertain situation.
In attempting to defend the ERP, Grace argued that the Wagner Act constituted an
excessive use of federal power since, according to him, it obligated management to
accept the introduction of a labor union.26
As steel executives vigorously fought the Wagner Act, labor heralded it as an
important breakthrough in securing the right to organize. Labor now could rely on
government-monitored elections (through the National Labor Relations Board) to win the
22 Grace, "Industry and the Public," 32. In this article, Grace attacked the Wagner Act as a
violation of personal liberty by the national government. Grace claimed that before the New Deal
legislation, relationships between labor and management were fine. After such legislation, however, labor
and management were now engaged in a fight against labor organizers. See page 43 for the entire text of
this discussion. For a thorough discussion of the New Deal era see William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D.
Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963).
23 Eugene G. Grace, IndustlY and the Public, Forty-Fifth General Meeting of the American Iron
and Steel Institute (New York: May 28,1936),17, Harold 1. Ruttenberg Collection. The NIRA contained
Section 7(a) that allowed workers to bargain collectively with management through representatives of their
own choosing. Furthermore, the NIRA "implied that it was illegitimate for employers to stifle unions,
interfere with efforts to form unions, or refuse to enter into bargaining relationships." See Zieger,
American Workers, American Unions, 28-29. Later, when the Supreme Court ruled the Wagner Act
constitutional, committee minutes of the ERP show that the representatives immediately questioned how
this decision impacted the Bethlehem ERP. For a first-hand account, see Minutes ofSpecial Meeting of
No.1 Standing Committee-Rules, etc., by Charles E. Davis, chairman and Percy B. Grumblin, Secretary
(April 27, 1937), (photocopy), Howard Truman Curtiss Papers, Penn State University, State College,
Pennsylvania.
24 The vague wording of Section 7(a) was one reason why the NIRA was struck down. In 1935,
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) bolstered this section. In no uncertain terms, the act outlawed
company unions as a means of collective bargaining. For an overview, see Melvyn Dubofsky and Foster
Rhea Dulles, Labor in America (Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 1999), 259-261. For an in-depth discussion of
Robert F. Wagner and the NLRA, see 1. Joseph Huthmacker, Senator Robert F. Wagner and the Rise of
Urban Liberalism (New York: Atheneum, 1968).
25 Dubofsky and Dulles, 260.
26 Sholes, "Eugene G. Grace," 177.
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representation that they selected free from employer coercion. 27 As a result of such
legislation, the period 1936-1937 saw the SWOC continually pressuring steel companies
for union recognition.28 This increased activity forced Eugene Grace to take the
offensive against SWOC activities in the form of his introductory letters in the Review.
Many steel executives, Grace included, felt that the Wagner Act was an attempt
by the government to "drive a wedge between the employer and his employees.,,29
Furthermore, Grace hinted that the government unfairly aided labor. He felt that the
Wagner Act was "an attempt to do for national labor unions by law what they have been
unable to do for themselves by appeals to workers who have resisted them at every
turn.,,30 Grace, however, ignored the fact that outside labor unions were not allowed at
Bethlehem Steel. Therefore, it often was not that workers resisted joining a labor union;
rather, they could not organize especially as the 1930s progressed and Bethlehem Steel
became increasingly anti-union.
Although Grace vehemently opposed collective bargaining and labor unions
before the New Deal, the new legislation intensified his opposition to both. Collective
bargaining and union representation, when conducted by outside agencies, took power
away from management. Eugene Grace was not alone with his thoughts concerning
collective bargaining by an outside organization. Many employers felt that "the
immediate results of giving a voice to employees through delegated representatives were
wholly selfish and not based upon investigation as to conditions, and were made without
27 Sholes, "Eugene G. Grace," 177.
28 Zeiger, 49.
29 Grace, "The President's Address," 39.
30 Eugene G. Grace, "The President's Address," Year Book ofthe American Iron and Steel
Institute (New York: American Iron and Steel Institute, 1935), 39.
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any assumption of responsibility whatsoever.,,3! Such selfish motives included the
aforementioned loss of power that executives throughout the country feared.
It is no surprise that throughout his tenure at Bethlehem, Grace abided by a
"dictatorial management style" and a "don't rock the boat" attitude when conducting
business and when dealing with labor.32 It must be remembered that throughout the
1930s workers attempted to limit management's authority over the labor process and to
maintain and improve their position through a contract and rights guaranteed to them
through government acts.33 To Grace, collective bargaining meant "that the employees
were part of a general labor union extending beyond the boundaries of this concern
[Bethlehem Steel]." When this was the case "he would have no official dealings" with
any of these groupS.34 Furthermore, Grace claimed that "even ifninety five percent of
his workers belonged to a union, he would refuse to recognize it.,,35 In his opinion,
refusing to deal with a union did not allow for any groups to significantly change or
"rock the boat" at Bethlehem.
As leader of the number two steel producer in the United States, Grace influenced
the entire steel industry. In addition to serving as president of the AISI, the trade group
that worked to promote the interests of the steel industry, Grace later served during
World War II as the leader of the Steel Industry Advisory Committee to the War
31 "Socialized Labor Brings Odd Results," The New York Times, 27 July 1919, 26. Eugene
Grace and Judge Gary of United States Steel undoubtedly agreed with such thoughts of giving employees a
voice in corporations.
32 Irwin M. Marcus, review of CJ'isis in Bethlehem: Big Steel's Battle to Survive, by John
Strohmeyer. Pennsylvania HistOly 62, no. 2 (1995): 16.
33 Zeiger, 28.
34 "Steel and the Open Shop," The Independent 105 (January 1, 1921): 16.
35 William E. Leuchtenburg, The Perils afProsperity /9/4-/932 second edition (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press', 1993), 98.
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Production Board.36 As president of the AISI, Grace held the power to influence
attitudes, such as the open-shop policy, throughout the entire industry. Because of
Grace's influence over the steel industry, in 1943, Harold J. Ruttenberg, assistant to the
director of the steel division of the War Production Board, in a letter to Senator Harry S.
Truman, claimed "The power of Eugene Grace ... certainly warrants Congressional
inquiry.,,3? As a result of his leadership positions in the steel industry, Grace made
important decisions that influenced all of America.
In his obituary on July 26, 1960, The New York Times heralded Grace as a leader
who helped to improve labor relations. The piece claimed that Grace "never forgot the
lessons he learned as a worker [hard work and dedication to the company] and put into
effect what were then innovations to improve labor relations. ,,38 The ERP certainly was
a labor innovation. Later, however, Grace tried to use the ERP to deprive workers of the
right afforded to them by the Wagner Act. While Eugene Grace certainly fostered
Bethlehem Steel's rise to prominence, he also was the force behind an oppressive labor
program.
36 Harold J. Ruttenberg, "The Bethlehem Psychology, October 26, 1943," (photocopy ofhand-
written source), p. 2, Harold 1. Ruttenberg Collection. The American Iron and Steel Institute was at the
time the "vehicle for cooperative consideration of every aspect of the industry's problems." The Institute
focused on manufacturing, economic, technical, and labor affairs in addition to drafting the NRA code for
the steel industry. See Robert Tilove, Collective Bargaining in the SteellndustlY (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1948),36.
37 Harold 1. Ruttenberg, to Senator Harry S. Truman, 7 May 1943 (photocopy), 2, Harold 1.
Ruttenberg Collection.
38 "Eugene G. Grace, Steel Aide, Dies," The New York Times, 26 July 1960, 29. The September,
1960 issue of the Review commemorated the death of Eugene Grace. The letter by Arthur B. Homer, the
successor of Grace, spoke very highly of Grace and his legacy at Bethlehem. See Arthur B. Homer, "A
Look Ahead," The Bethlehem Review 80 (September 1960), 1.
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Part II: Overview of Employee Representation Plans
Without dedicated men and later women workers, companies such as Bethlehem
Steel would not have flourished. To this end, it is important to remember that in the steel
industry the capital and the machinery needed to produce the final product often times
overshadowed the work force. 39 Employers had to spend enormous amounts of capital
just to create the physical plants before they even dealt with labor. This structure often
caused management to focus on the necessary equipment to manufacture steel, whil~
often overlooking labor.
As employees demanded more concessions from management between the 1920s
and the 1930s, elaborate plans of representation emerged. Eventually, to keep a content
workforce and to keep real unions at arms length, employers established company
unions, or as many corporations identified such programs, employee representation plans
(ERPs), promoting them as channels for communication with management and as
sources of shop-floor power for the employees. Similarly, Frank Purnell, President of
The Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company, claimed that "Employee Representation
Plans guarantee the rights of the individual, and any employee may raise any question he
wishes at any time," thus maintaining open channels of communication between labor
and management.40 Employers throughout the Steel industry claimed that ERPs were
founded upon truly American principles, heralding them as guarantees of free speech in
the workplace. Bethlehem Steel was no different.
39 Ben M. Selekman, Employees' Representation in Steel Works (New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 1924),45.
40 Frank Purnell, "Progress in Labor Relations," Year Book ofthe American Iron and Steel
Institute (New York: American Iron and Steel Institute, 1935), 59.
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ERPs allowed employees to confer with management representatives concerning
issues such as hours worked, rates of pay, workplace safety, and other working
conditions.41 Also, ERPs established grievance procedures, terms for collective
negotiations, and educational procedures for both labor and management.42 As a result,
ERPs throughout the steel industry created, according to Grace, a "mutuality of interest.
They... [did not] ...provide for outsiders foreign to our industry to dictate to the men and
management of the industry as to what constitutes proper relationships between them.,,43
On the other hand, company unions, a term originated by organized labor, were
labeled by The Nation as "organizations built by the initiative of the employer in order to
channel away the discontent of his employees and to neutralize their desire for real labor
organization.,,44 Employers such as Grace emphasized the positives of the ERP (close,
paternalistic relationships) while lambasting the negatives of the outside unions
(increased costs to the company and the disappearance of paternalistic relations).
While most ERPs originated during the First World War, the earliest forms of
employee representation date to the late nineteenth century. As such, employee
representation is one of the oldest voluntary plans entered into between labor and
management to preserve friendly relations in the workplace.45 The first historically
significant ERP appeared in Filene's Department Store ofBoston, which sponsored
4\ National Industrial Conference Board, Collective Bargaining Through Employee
Representation (New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1933), 2.
42 Hemy C. Metcalf, "Employee Representation," The Annals ofthe American Academy of
Political and Social Sciences 184 (March 1936): 186.
43 Eugene Grace, "Acceptance of Gary Memorial Medal," Year Book ofthe American/ron and
Steel Institute (New York: American Iron and Steel Institute, 1934), 138.
44 Karl Lore, "Labor Faces the Company Union," The Nation 138 (April 11, 1934): 406.
45 "Labor Board Bars Bethlehem," special to The New York Times 16 August 1939: 1. For more
on the literature of employee representation, see Paul F. Gemmill, "Review: The Literature of Employee
Representation," The Quarterly Journal ofEconomics 42, no. 3 (May 1928): 479-494.
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employee activities in 1898.46 Known as the Filene Cooperative Association, it assumed
control of the company's personnel programs. The word cooperative is important since it
signifies that management and labor maintained a healthy and open relationship.
Although this association served a small labor force, it was the first of its type in the field
of employee representation.47
The factory committee system of the Nernst Lamp Works in Pittsburgh was more
influential than the Filene Cooperative Association. Created between 1903 and 1904,
this plan evolved rather quickly into an industrial democracy plan. The committee at
Nernst, composed of management representatives, workers, and foremen, evaluated
suggestions raised by the employees. According to the management, this plan created a
democratic system of government, similar to the system used in the United States.48 The
factory committee at Nernst was groundbreaking since employees brought their
grievances to a committee to have them resolved. This gave the employee a voice in the
governance of the corporation. Other companies such as Bethlehem Steel later used this
aspect of the plan as a model for their employee representative activities.
Taken as a whole, the ERPs throughout much of the United States arose in
response to the wartime labor demands during the First World War. Employers needed a
productive workforce to meet the high levels of demand generated by the war. To
achieve increased production, the government encouraged unions during wartime to help
46 Neil W. Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining First Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951),
37.
47 Daniel Nelson, Managers and Workers: Origins ofthe Twentieth-CentlllY FactOlY System in
the United States Second Edition (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 169.
48 Ibid., 169-170.
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maintain industrial peace.49 The war effort could not be sustained if labor and
management fought. As a result, the atmosphere in industry during World War I
prompted discussion of "worker control of production" where labor gained a voice with
management. 50 According to President Wilson, the industrial community of the United
States would not have "proper success ... [ifJ ...capital and labor are to continue to be
antagonistic instead ofbeing partners.,,51
Generally, employers instituted ERPs to meet certain requirements, such as
decisions by the National War Labor Board (NWLB) in World War 1. During the period
1919-1926, the number of representation plans increased from 196 to 943.52 This
statistic illustrates that employers attempted to appease their workforce, while
temporarily conforming to government demands. After the war, company unions were
firmly in place and many laborers grew accustomed to this form of representation. As a
result, when corporations established ERPs they considered them revolutionary in the
field of labor relations, and put forth a serious effort to publicize the merits of them.
Employee representation constituted a new model of personnel management, often
leading to the creation of public relations and personnel departments. Specifically, many
of the companies that established ERPs found that when such plans were used according
to their terms they could increase organizational efficiency through works councils,
49 Harry Millis, How Collective Bargaining Works (New York: the Twentieth Century Fund,
1942),6. It is important to note that while the War Labor Board encouraged unions, employers created
ERPs as an effort to evade the policies and rulings of this board.
so Daniel Nelson, Shifting Fortunes: The Rise and Decline ofAmerican Labor, ji'01ll the 1820s to
the Present (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1997),90.
51 "Industrial Democracy Already on Trial," The New York Times, 25 May 1919, Section: Arts
and Leisure, 52.
52 Ibid. This number also includes company unions.
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conference boards, and company unions. 53 Employers did not mind creating such
programs if productivity increased and morale improved.54 In spite of the different
names, all plans brought the employee and management representatives together to
discuss company policies and adjudicate grievances. 55 As such, employee representation
sought to "enhance organization performance and generate a win-win outcome for both
employers and employees" while also creating the appearance of industrial democraci6
Only if management created the plans to truly correct labor problems, and not to
quell the union campaign, did EPRs succeed. According to David McCabe, chairman of
the American Economic Association, "the development of employee representation
was... evidence of. .. [growing] ... 'confidence and understanding between employers and
employees' in this country.,,57 In fact, most executives genuinely desired to "become a
unit where interests were mutual.,,58 After all, both parties had a stake in the success or
the failure of the corporation especially during the war campaign and later when many
employees became share-holders of corporations. Consequently, it was only logical to
develop a plan ofmutual understanding to create a peaceful working environment where
both parties could have their voices heard. The inherent problem at many corporations
was that both groups found negotiations difficult since each side wanted "to get as much
53 Millis, 563.
54 Nelson, Managers and Workers, 142.
55 Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 171.
56 Bruce E. Kaufman, "The Case for the Company Union," Labor HistOlY 41, no. 3 (2000): 332.
57 David A. McCabe, "The Effect ofNew Deal Legislation Upon Industrial Relations," The
American Economic Review 26, no. 1, supplement, Papers and Proceedings ofthe Forty-Eighth Annual
Meeting ofthe American Economic Association (March 1936): 291.
58 Joanna Farrell Sturdivant, "Employee Representation Plan of the Durham Hosiery Mills,"
Social Forces 4, no. 3 (March 1926): 626.
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and to give as little" as it could.59 Additionally, since ERPs had relatively little power,
there was no backing to make truly significant gains. This put labor and management at
odds.
The ERP that stimulated the creation ofBethlehem's plan and those at other large
corporations originated at the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company under the guidance of
John D. Rockefeller, Jr. This was by far the best-known company union before World
War 1.60 Introduced in 1915 after the infamous 1914 Ludlow Massacre, the Rockefeller
Plan, or Colorado Plan as it was also known, attempted to rectify the conditions that had
caused the violence. 61 Rockefeller felt that "the lack of personal relationships between
directing management and employees ...was the true point of origin of the bitter conflict
of the coal strike at Colorado.,,62 His plan allowed for workers from specific mines or
shops to elect representatives to district conferences. At these conferences, the elected
representatives met with senior officers from the company up to three times a year. Joint
committees, consisting of three employee representatives and three company
representatives dealt with wages and working conditions, safety and accident prevention,
59 Metcalf, 184,
60 Daniel Nelson, "The Company Union Movement, 1900-1937: A Reeaxamination," Business
HistOlY Review 56, no. 3 (1982): 341. For a biased, yet thorough discussion of the origins of The
Rockefeller Plan, see John D. Rockefeller, Jr., "The Four Partners in Industry: New Working Principles
for the Brotherhood of Man," Forum LXI, no, 2 (February 1919): 178-188,
61 The Ludlow Massacre was the climax oflabor tensions at the Colorado Fuel and Iron
Company, In 1913, the United Mine Workers sent organizers into the company to organize the workers.
Management fiercely opposed this group. As tensions progressed, "open warfare continued for months in
the Colorado mine fields and finally reached a bloody climax when the'militia attacked a colony of strikers
at Ludlow. See Dubofsky and Dulles, Labor in America, 182-183.
62 Selekman, 27. This work evaluates the Employee Representation Plan at the Minnequa Steel
Works, which was part of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company. The plan at Minnequa we'nt into effect on
May 6, 1916, again after a strike, this time the coal strike of 1913, It is interesting to note that the workers
of Minnequa made no demand for any type of plan when the ,"Industrial Representation Plan and
Memorandum of Agreement Respecting Employment and Living and Working Conditions, Applicable to
the Minnequa Steel Works" went into effect.
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sanitation, health and housing.63 This plan "included a method of representation by
which every employee of the company (;ould obtain redress for any wrong done.,,64 It is
this sincerity that ERPs required from upper management for the plans to succeed.65
Since Rockefeller touted the merits of this plan and found his workforce to be content
with it, other employers followed suit, making it the model for other employee
representation activities prior to 1935.
It is important to remember, however, that management initiated such plans.
Essentially, the Bethlehem ERP was the "pet of Schwab and Grace.,,66 Management
attempted to give the appearance of industrial democracy in which employees had a
direct say in various matters of the company. Since all plans operated under the
patronage of the employers, as can be expected, organized labor despised ERPs as
paternalistic enterprises. Especially after the emergence of the New Deal legislation,
labor identified such plans as company unions since the ERP "imply[ed] in the very
name an organization owned and controlled by the employer to suit his own purposes.,,67
What is more, although company unions achieved success during in the 1920s, the 1930s
saw the use of company unions and ERPs rise to a new level. Because of increasing
pressure from outside labor unions, company unions attracted more interest from
63 Greg Patmore, "An Employer Response to Workplace Democracy: The Rockefeller Plan and
the Fate of Employee Representation Plans, 1915-1935," Research Reports from the Rockefeller Archive
Center (FaIVWinter 2001): 9. Other companies to have ERPs during the first half of the twentieth century
included: CW Post's National Trade and Worker Association, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Goodyear, and
AT&T. For a discussion of these plans, see Bruce E. Kaufman and Morris M. Kleiner, eds. Employee
Representation: Altematives and Future Directions (Madison: Industrial Relations Research Association,
1993),373-379,
64 "Rockefeller Finds Workers Content, The New York Times, 12 August 1918, 12.
65 Selekman, 15.
66 E. 1. Lever, "Bethlehem Background," The New Republic 104 (April 7,1941),464.
67 William M. Leiserson, "Employee Representation," The Reference Shelf 10, no. 1 (January
1935), 74.
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management and caused more controversy with labor than ever. As a result, employers
introduced them to counter the efforts of AFL organizations.68
As unions gained popularity in the 1930s after the passage of the NIRA, and later
the Wagner Act, companies with ERPs, to varying degrees, experienced labor discontent.
Such discontent was also present at firms with no representation plans. Labor, no longer
desiring to bargain collectively under the control of management, viewed such plans as
fraudulent and as attempts to "break the labor organizations, camouflaged with hand-
picked representatives" of management.69 Herein lay the fundamental problem ofERPs:
although workers' representatives raised questions concerning working conditions and
other issues, the final decision always rested solely with management.70 While
individual workers were powerless when dealing with management, the ERP created a
collective voice for labor when dealing with management, albeit a voice with limited
range. Also, the termination of the ERP was always a possibility. ERPs had definite
limits in terms of what was covered under the plan and what was not under the
jurisdiction of the representatives. In reality, if the program became too costly or took
too much power from management, it could be ended at any time.71 On the other hand,
an outside labor union could not be terminated so easily.
From the onset, workers discerned the push towards company unionism and
voiced their displeasure with employee representation. Management, including Eugene
68 Kaufman, 382.
69 Leiserson, "Employee Representation," 75.
70 Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining, 37. Essentially, there were no negations since
management had the final say in matters. This work compares employee representation and collective
bargaining. Many employers, specifically Eugene Grace and other steel executives, argued that employee
representation and collective bargaining were the same. To this, labor strongly disagreed.
71 Metcalf, 536.
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Grace and the executives of Bethlehem Steel, downplayed this perception of the ERP and
attempted to win support for the plan based on its general merits. Company newsletters
and pamphlets provided an excellent vehicle for such attempts. Grace turned his
attention and Bethlehem's resources to the Review to influence the opinions of his
employees concerning the Bethlehem Plan.
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Part III: The Bethlehem Plan of Employees' Representation
The Bethlehem Plan of Employees' Representation went into effect at all of the
company's plants in 1918. Following a series of earlier strikes at the Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania plant, the management of Bethlehem Steel created the ERP.72 Strikes had
posed a serious disruption to wartime production leading to government intervention. In
Machinists, Electrical Workers Et. AI. v. Bethlehem Steel Company, the NWLB required
Bethlehem to introduce committees for collective bargaining and resume production at
once.73 Initially, Bethlehem Steel refused to comply with what it perGeived as
~ '.,
government intrusion into its business. In other industries, this guarantee of collective
bargaining resulted in "widespread adoption of shop committees or worker's councils in
firms covered by NWLB awards.,,74 The NWLB forced management to make
concessions to labor. This was an initial victory for labor. The Bethlehem Plan, "an
elaborate plan of employee representation," was Grace's attempt to fulfill the NWLB
mandate. 75
The ERP established a method for representation of Bethlehem Steel employees
(see Figure 1).76 The Bethlehem ERP was a joint-committee employee representation
plan, consisting of a central committee or council of employee representatives and
72 Such strikes stood to potentially undermine the war effort. For this reason, the government
required some form of collective bargaining.
73 National War Labor Board, Findings in re Machinists and Electrical Workers and Other
Employees versus Bethlehem Steel Company, Bethlehem, PA Docket 22 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1918).
The main issues during this strike were a complicated bonus system, the absence of collective bargaining,
and no minimum wage guarantee.
74 Nelson, Managers and Workers, 172.
75 Brody, Labor in Crisis, 85.
76 Bethlehem Steel, "Plan of EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION at the BETHLEHEM PLANT
of BETHLEHEM STEEL COMPANY" (January 1920), 1, Box 4, Howard Truman Curtiss Papers, Penn
State University, Hist'orical Collections and Labor Achieves, Special Collections Department. The
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Figure 1. This schematic appeared in David J. Saposs, "The Steel Worker's Dilemma," Review ofReviews
94 (August 1936): 25. The entire article specifically concentrated on the Bethlehem Plan of Employees'
Representation throughout the Bethlehem Steel Corporation.
management. By far, this ERP was the most common in manufacturing since it
contained equal numbers of employee representatives and representatives of
management, thereby, giving the appearance of equality or industrial democracy. 77
Furthermore, the introduction of the ERP specifically stated that those employees who
served as representatives under this plan would not experience discrimination or "conflict
with his or her right to belong or not to belong to any lawful society, fraternity, union or
other organization.,,78 In spite of this declaration, Bethlehem went to great lengths to
prevent outside unions from taking hold. The preceding quotation comprised the
Historical Collections and Labor Archives at Penn State University, as part of the Howard Truman Curtiss
Papers, have significant holdings concerning Bethlehem Steel.
77 National Industrial Conference Board, Collective Bargaining Through Employee
Representation, 19-20, 47.
78 Bethlehem Steel, "Plan of EMPLOYEES , REPRESENTATION," 1.
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INTENTIONAL SECOND EXPOSURE
HOW EM PLOY EES' REPRESENTATION WORKS
Figure I. This schematic appeared in David J. Saposs, "The Steel Worker's Dilemma," RC\'ie\l' O/RC1'iC\\'\
9,,( (August 19..'6): 25. The entire article speeificallyconcentrated on the Bethlehem Plan ol'Employees'
Representation throughout the Bethlehem Steel Corporation.
managcment. By far, this ERP was the most common in manufacturing since it
containcd cqual numbers of cmployee representatives and representatives of
managcment, thereby, giving the appearance of equality or industrial democracy77
Furthermorc, thc introduction of the ERP specifically stated that those employees who
served as representatives under this plan would not experience discrimination or "conflict
with his or her right to belong or not to belong to any lawful society, fraternity, union or
other organization."n In spite of this declaration, Bethlehem went to great lengths to
prevent outside unions from taking hold. The preceding quotation comprised the" .
I listorical Collections and Labor Archives Gt Penn StGle University, as part'l1f the Howurd Truman Curtiss'
Papers. haH: signilicant holdings concerning Bethlehem Steel. .
-- National Industrial Conference Board, Co//eelil'e Bargaining 71ll'OugII Emp/oyee
RC/Jrc.\CnWlion. 19-20,47. '.'
~x Bethlehem Steel, "Plan o'f EMPLOYEES' REPR,ESENTATI0N," I.
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preamble to-the ERP. The use of the word "lawful" was revealing. Most likely,
management used "lawful" to demonstrate to the employees that the ERP complied with
the law and, in fact, was what the government intended companies to institute. This
language attempted to convince labor that the ERP of Bethlehem was actually prescribed
by law. Although ERPS at the time complied with government regulations, the
management of Bethlehem clearly manipulated the meaning of the language when they
attempted to justify their use of the ERP.
The ERP, a simple typewritten document only eight pages in length, contained
eleven subsections. According to the "Principles of Representation," the Bethlehem ERP
was designed:
to give the employees of the Company a voice in regard to the conditions under
which they labor. .. to provide an orderly...procedure for the prevention and
adjustment of any future differences and to anticipate the problem of continuous
employment as it will present itself through trade fluctuations and other
conditions at the termination of the war. 79
The next section after the purposes of the plan was entitled "Representation." It stated:
"Representation shall be by Departments and groups of Departments on the basis of one
Employees' Representative for each one hundred (100) employees, or major fraction
thereof."so The management hoped that this ratio of representatives to employees would
pacify the workforce. Each representative served a one-year term. Additionally, any
employee was eligible to serve as a representative as long as he was employed by
79 Bethlehem Steel Corporation, "Representation of Employees in Plants of the Bethlehem Steel
Corporation," 1918: 3. Later, the ERP appeared as a sixteen page pamphlet instead ofa simple type-
written document.
80 Bethlehem Steel Corporation, "Plan of EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION," 1. This was the
ratio ofrepresentatives to employees for the Bethlehem Plant. This number varied depending on the size
of the respective plant.
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Bethlehem for one year prior to the day of nominations and was over the age of twenty-
one. As well, ERPs included a citizenship requirement.8] The employees who were
eligible to vote (those on the payroll for sixty days) used a secret ballot to select the
employee representative of their choice. Furthermore, the ERP delineated the duties of
the officers. 82 The plan established committees and listed the order of committee
meetings, while creating specific guidelines for such meetings.83 Section Nine
guaranteed that the representative was "free to discharge his duties in an independent
manner" with no fear that his association "with the company" would be "affected...by
any action taken by him in good faith.,,84 Additional sections in the pamphlet included:
provisions for an annual conference between representatives and management,
procedures for adjustment, and a section on amendments. The management of
Bethlehem Steel designed its ERP well; it covered specific situations while also
establishing the workings of the plan. Finally, the Bethlehem ERP:
provides for collective bargaining, or more properly as the employees regard it,
collective dealing. It affords a prompt, fair and effective means for settling
problems which arise from day to day. The workers in each plant have their own
Representation Plan with the opportunity to handle their own local problems
according to their own immediate needs.85
8\ This citizenship requirement stipulated that employees must be American citizens to have the
protection offered by the ERP.
82 The Bethlehem ERP listed specific duties for the following officers: Chairman, Vice-
Chairman, Secretary, and Treasurer.
83 Committees included: Rules, Ways and Means, Safety and Prevention of Accident,
PracticelMethods and Economy, Employees' Transportation, WageslPiece Work, Bonus, and Tonnage
Schedules, Employment and Working Conditions, HousinglDomestic Economies and Living Conditions,
Heath and Works Sanitation, Education and Publications, Pensions and Relief, Athletics and Recreation,
and Continuous Employment and Condition ofIndustry.
84 Bethlehem Steel, "Plan of EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION," 9.
85 Eugene G. Grace, "Security of Employment," Bethlehem Review 29 (July 3, 1936),2.
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In practice, the ERP functioned rather simply. Any laborer with a complaint went
to his specific representative from the General Body of representatives. Often, the
representatives settled the issue. Although the representative was authorized to settle
mundane issues such as safety violations and minor worker grievances, such
representatives could not settle larger issues dealing with pay. If the grievance was not
settled, the employee representatives sent the issue to the appropriate sub-committee, for
example, hours, pensions, rules, safety, or wages. Each committee consisted of half
employee representatives and half management. The subcommittees had a chairman and
a secretary. Companies. like Bethlehem'Steel established subcommittees to relieve the
general body of representatives of trivial matters, leaving them free to deal with major
issues facing the representatives. 86 Committee minutes reveal that the sub-committees
did function in this capacity. For instance, the minutes of an April, 1937, meeting
indicates that items discussed included the installation of a gate and the design of a
parking system to relieve traffic at the plant. 87 These were issues that top executives did
not want to use their time to solve. However, employees found such issues important.
Bethlehem hoped that such an arrangement appeared to put the worker on the same basis
as the management.
If the issue was not resolved at the subcommittee level, it went to an appeals
committee, again containing half employee representatives and half management. If this
committee did not settle the issue, it went to the president of the company for settlement,
86 National Industrial Conference Board, Collective Bargaining Through Employee
Representation, 21.
87 Minutes ofSpecial Meeting ofNo.1 Standing Committee-Rules, etc., Plan ofEmployees'
Representation at the Cambria Plant ofBethlehem Steel Company, by Charles E. Davis, chairman and
Percy B. Grumbling, Secretary (May 29, 1936 and April 27, 1937).
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with an arbitration procedure ifhis decision was appealed.88 Only rarely, did cases go
this far, such as those dealing with large-scale pay increases and issues that could
potentially be precedent setting. Here, Eugene Grace wanted a say if any decision
affected the entire corporation or the entire steel industry. According to Bethlehem Steel,
the ERP settled most cases quickly and peacefully, namely because many of these cases
required minimal concessions on management's part with little loss of capital or power.
Management touted the advantages of the Bethlehem ERP. Accordingly, the
ERP helped to bring about improved working conditions at all of Bethlehem Steel's
plants. Increased morale also helped to increase production. The ERP, according to the
Bethlehem Steel executives, aided the relationship between labor and management, while
increasing labor stability and also improving supervision methods and employee
education. All of this information was printed in the Review. 89
88 David Page, "The Steel Worker's Dilenuna," The Review ofReviews 94 (August 1936): 25.
89 Bethlehem Steel Corporation, "Bethlehem's Joint Employee-Management Activities," The
Bethlehem Review' 20 (August 6, 1929), 3.
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Part IV: Format and Layout of The Bethlehem Review
Publication of the Review began on April 24, 1924 (see Figure 2), six years after
implementation of the Bethlehem Plan of Employees' Representation, and continued
until the company declared bankruptcy in late 2001. Throughout the seventy-seven years
of its existence, the Review went through significant changes. Simply, the Review was a
company newsletter intended to address areas of interest to Bethlehem Steel employees.
Throughout the period of this study, such issues included, but were not limited to:
defense production, expansion of the physical plant of the corporation, labor policies,
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Figure 2. This is the cover from the The Bethlehem Review 1 (April 24, 1924). Every issue of the Review
began with a letter from the president of the corporation. Note the rather short length of the letter. In later
years (Figure 6) as labor discontent grew, Grace's letters grew substantially in length.
safety, and benefit plans for the employees. As a result, the Review is important for
examining the labor practices of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation.
Early, the Review was a very simple publication in terms of design and page
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length. Initially, the Review was four pages in length. During that time, the publication
was nothing more than a very simple company newsletter. Bethlehem Steel realized that
such a publication, in addition to an annual report for the employees, was just as
important as the documents provided to stockholders. After all, both stockholders and
employees had a stake in the corporation and were entitled to accurate information
concerning the company. It was wise for the management of any corporation to "tell its
employees what big business is all about.,,90 In Grace's own words, the Review gave
"the employees information which they as workers and stockholders should have
regarding their company and its workings.',91 This was especially true since a significant
number of employees were also stockholders through the Employee Stock and Savings
Plan. For example, the Review highlighted the advantages of the relief plan that went
into effect on June 1, 1926, for Bethlehem employees.92 As Bethlehem Steel discovered,
employees desired to know information about and to take an active role in the
functioning of the company.
Throughout the first seventeen years of the Review, the basic layout followed that
of the first issue in 1924. Every issue began with a letter from the president. From 1918
to 1941 most of these letters specifically addressed labor issues; a large majority of such
letters dealt with the current state of the ERP and any related activities or issues affecting
the entire steel industry. Additionally, Grace discussed national and world events that
90 Dickson Hartwell, "Telling the Employees," The Public Opinion Quarterly 5, no. 1 (March
1941): 93. This article graded the annual reports sent out to the employees by the management of specific
corporations. As for Bethlehem Steel's publication, it received a Class B rating meaning that it was a very
good annual report; however, it did have some flaws preventing it from earning a Class A rating.
9\ Eugene G. Grace, Bethlehem Review 1 (April 24, 1924), 1.
92 Eugene G. Grace, "Bethlehem's New Relief Plan," The Bethlehem Reviewll (April 24, 1926),
1. The purposes of this plan were to provide disability benefits for employees and death benefits for
widows.
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stood to impact Bethlehem Steel's business. Such issues included the Great Depression,
the recovery efforts to pull the country out of the economic crisis, and World War II.
Grace's commentary on these events attempted to persuade workers to agree with his
point of view on such issues.
Following the opening letter, the Review contained short articles on various
aspects of labor relations, many spelling out the positives of the ERP, while other articles
related directly to various production issues at Bethlehem Steel or the steel industry as a
whole.93 Included in many articles were bar and pie graphs dealing with accidents, pay
rates, overtime, and pension payouts (see Figure 3). Grace and the public relations
department created headlines that grabbed the attention of the worker. Examples of
headlines used by Grace included: "Service and Quality," "A New Era for Bethlehem,"
"Building and Home Ownership," and "Practical Benefits of Accident Prevention.,,94 All
of these articles addressed issues that, in addition to labor policies, stood to benefit
workers. Under such auspices, the Review functioned as originally planned.
Often, management devoted an entire page of the Review to a chart outlining the
progress of employee representation activities.95 The inclusion of such charts allowed
management to present the labor force with scientific-looking evidence that employee
93 Some specific examples of headlines from the period 1924-1941 include "Current Policy on
Employment," "Employees' Representation Plans Throughout the Steel Industry," "Employees'
Representation Plans Stand Test," and "Nearly Twenty years of Collective Bargaining." For topics
covered by ERPs, referr back to page 11.
94 For the full text of these articles see Eugene G. Grace, "Service and Quality," The Bethlehem
Review, 4 (November 7, 1924), Eugene G. Grace, "Building and Home Ownership," The Bethlehem
Review, 8 (August 3, 1925), Eugene G. Grace, "A New Era for Bethlehem," The Bethlehem Review, 9
(November 25, 1925), Eugene G. Grace, "Practical Benefits of Accident Prevention," The Bethlehem
Review 18 (January 25,1929).
95 The March 1939, edition of the Review contained eleven charts. This was by far the highest
number of charts forthe length of this study.
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representation worked at Bethlehem Steel. This provided solid, tangible proof to defend
against an outside union at Bethlehem. In addition, the company went to great
Figure 3. This is a sample illustration depicting the types of cases that came before the employees'
representation committee in the year 1935. The Review contained numerous graphics depicting various
areas of the ERP. This graphic appeared in The Bethlehem Review 28 (March 1936).
lengths to demonstrate how well things functioned under the ERP, highlighting
numerous examples of employee gains. In a similar manner, the management included
lists of other companies that used ERPs similar to Bethlehem's plan.96 Although it is
true that the Bethlehem Plan reflected the national trends throughout the steel industry,
the management of Bethlehem Steel reiterated to its workforce that the ERP, and not an
independent labor union, was the proper course of action.97 At times in the 1930s, the
96 Other companies with Employees' Representation Plans similar to Bethlehem's were Inland
Steel Company, National Steel Corporation, Pittsburgh Steel Company, Republic Steel Corporation,
United States Steel Corporation, and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company. According to the Review, over
eighty-five percent of the steel industry followed Employee Representation Plans. See, "Employees'
Representation Plans Throughout the Steel Industry," Bethlehem Review 25, (September 25, 1933),3.
97 Mindy Kaye Small, "A Piece of the Pie: An Oral History of the Union Movement at
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INTENTIONAL SECOND EXPOSURE
representation worked at Bethlehem Steel. This provided solid, tangible proof to defend
against an outside union at Bethlehem. In addition, the company went to great
Figure 3. This is a sample illustration depicting the types of cases that came before the employees'
representation committee in the year 1935. The Rc\'ie\\" eontainednumerolls graphics depicting various
areas of the ERP. This graphic appeared in The Bet!I1ehell/ RCl'iell' 28 (March 1936).
lengths to demonstrate how well things functioned under the ERP, highlighting
numerous examples of employee gains. In a similar manner, the management included
lists of other companies that used ERPs similar to Bethlehem's plan. 96 Although it is
true that the Bethlehem Plan reflected the national trends throughout the steel industry,
the management of Bethlehem Steel reiterated to its workforce that the ERP, and not an
independent labor union, was the proper course of action. 'J7 At times in the 1930s, the
')(, Other c0111panies vv'ith Enlployees' Repre~~ntation Plans. sinlilar.to Be-t.hleh~nl's were Inland
Steel Company, National Steel Corporation, Pittsburgh Steel Company. Republic Steel Corporation,
united States Steel Corporation, and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Compa'ny. According to the Review, ovel:
eighty-five percent of the steel industry followed Employee Representation Plans. See, "Employees' .
Representation Plans Tlu'oughout the Steel Industry," Bethlehem Revie,v 25,-(September 25,1933),3.
''7 Mindy Kaye Small, ';A Piece of the Pie: An Oral History of theUnion·tv!;ovement at
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Review also contained select passages from President Franklin D. Roosevelt, an anti-
union advertisement from the AISI, a thirteen page, glossy-cover, tribute to Charles
Schwab, reprints of speeches by Eugene Grace, and a lavish tribute to him-"Mr. Big"-
on his fiftieth anniversary with Bethlehem Steel.98
Beginning in July 1927, management initiated the first important change to the
format ofthe Review, devoting one issue to an annual report for the employees. This
issue reported items such as employee benefit programs, rates of employment, and salary
data.99 Employee benefit programs and pension programs went hand-in-hand with ERPs.
As such, ERPs were strengthened by pension plans, profit sharing, and other welfare
devices. 100 This was exactly the case at Bethlehem. Eugene Grace continually heralded
the employee benefit plans in editions of the Review in an attempt to get the labor force
of Bethlehem to have a vested interest in the continued successful operation of the
company.IOl In essence, Grace encouraged his employees to become part owners in the
business through acquisition of stock. 102 Essentially, the large number of employees who
took part in this program had "an added incentive in working for the good of the
Bethlehem Steel CorporatIOn" (Masters Thesis, Lehigh University, 1975), 7-8.
98 Harold 1. Ruttenberg, "Eugene Grace is Mr. Big in Steel Management," (photocopy, n.d.), p. 4,
Howard Truman Curtiss Papers.
99 "Annual Report to Employees Brings Wide Comment," The Bethlehem Review 34 (November
1,1938),9.
100 Millis, 906.
101 Such plans allowed employees to purchase Bethlehem Steel stock. Therefore, the employee
now became a Bethlehem Steel stockholder.
102 Eugene Grace, "Employees' Second Saving Plan," The Bethlehem Review 6 (February 2,
1925), 1. See also, Eugene Grace "Employees' Third Saving and Stock Ownership Plan, The Bethlehem
Review 10 (February 1, 1926), "Bethlehem's New Relief Plan," The Bethlehem Review 11 (April 24,
1926), and "The New Ownership in Industry," The Bethlehem Review 13 (February 1, 1927). All of these
articles deal with touting the advantages of the employee benefit programs at Bethlehem. Such issues
became a common occurrence during the history of the Review as a means of reiterating to the employees
the successful nature'of such programs.
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Corporation because they are [were], in a sense, working for themselves."I03
Management felt that it did not behoove the Bethlehem labor force to go on strike or
bring in an outside union since both of these stood to disrupt the manufacturing process
and ultimately hurt the company. In addition, the Review also included statistics
concerning employee participation in the election of employee representatives. Such
reports incorporated numbers of cases handled and described how the cases were
resolved. These issues of the Review allowed Grace to demonstrate the great lengths
Bethlehem went to provide for its workforce.
Aesthetically, the Review changed over time. During the late 1930s and early
1940s, the Review looked more like a magazine than a company newsletter. These issues
and all issues thereafter, contained large pictures of Bethlehem Steel plants or activities
involving Bethlehem Steel employees and products (see Figure 4).
BETHLEHEM REVIEW
Figure 4. Notice the distinct change in the cover of this edition. Instead of a letter from Grace, the
January 1937 Review contained this picture of a Bethlehem Steel plant. The paper for this edition was also
glossy, much like a modem-day tabloid magazine.
103 Eugen~ Grace, "A New Era for Bethlehem," The Bethlehem Review 9 (November 25, 1925),
1.
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Many issues of the Review, especially after 1935, contained impressive collections of
pictures that focused on various activities and noteworthy events. Also during this same
period, Grace's letters appeared on the second page of the Review. More often than not,
the first page now contained dramatic Bethlehem Steel pictures.
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Part V: Eugene Grace and The Bethlehem Review
During the early stages of the ERP in the 1920s the Bethlehem Plan provided the
workforce with modest gains in the form of increased hourly rates or physical
improvements at the plants. It was during this period that Eugene Grace utilized the
Review to herald the advantages of the ERP, and celebrate the period of relative
industrial peace that was present throughout the Corporation. As labor discontent grew
during the mid-1920s and the 1930s, however, workers began to identify ERPs as
"puppet[s], ... fake[s], and.. .joke[s]."I04 The same scenario became increasingly true at
Bethlehem Steel. Labor disliked company unions because they lacked the strong
bargaining power oflarge, independent labor unions. To counter increasing union
sentiment at Bethlehem, Grace turned to the Review.
In general, employers had to convince their workforces that strict adherence to
the company ERP was advantageous to joining an independent labor union. Along the
same lines, "a considerable number of employers ... found it. .. desirable to 'sell' the plan
to their employees."lo5 Often this was done when union leaders conducted membership
campaigns throughout the country. The Review provided Grace with the means for
accomplishing this task. Grace, however, took this to an even higher level with the
Review, his primary anti-union opinion-shaping tool at Bethlehem.
At the onset, the Review aided the Bethlehem Plan's alleged two-way system of
communication between labor and management. Such a channel was vital to the
implementation of the ERP. Grace continually asserted that the Review gave the
104 Small, "A Piece of the Pie," 84.
105 David 1. Saposs, "Organizational and Procedural Changes in Employee Representation Plans,"
The Joul'Ilal ofPolitical Economy 44 (December 1936): 805.
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employees the unbiased "facts of the business and of the activities in which the
employees are interested.,,106 Grace put an interesting spin on this in the April 22, 1925,
edition of the Review. According to Grace, the Bethlehem Plan gave "the management
an opportunity of presenting to the employees problems which must be considered in
carrying on the business.,,107 Although management needed to bring its problems to the
committee as well, Grace more often than not favored management's proposals over
those made by labor. After all, labor's demands normally required some concessions on
the part of management, concessions that sometimes resulted in a loss of control.
A common theme in Grace's introductory letters between 1924 and 1941 was
cooperation. 108 The first occasion that Grace spoke of cooperation was in his February 1,
1926, letter "Employees' Third Saving and Stock Ownership Plan.,,109 More discussion
of cooperation appeared eight months later. In his October 15, 1926, opening letter
"Modem Management," Grace acknowledged the troubled past between labor and
management. This trouble arose, according to him, because the two did not recognize
the mutual bonds between them concerning cooperation in terms of labor policies. Grace
argued that this situation changed once "employees and owners realize[d] that they are
[were] bound by a common interest." I 10 Here, Grace talked about mutual dependence
and the shared responsibility of both labor and management to ensure the success of the
106 "Giving Employees the Facts," contained in National Labor Relations Board, In the Matter oj
BETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, BETHLEHEM STEEL COMPANY, a
Pennsylvania Corporation and Steel Workers Organizing Committee Cases Nos. C-170, R-I77
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1939),26.
107 "Some Accomplishments of Bethlehem's Employee Representation Plan," The Bethlehem
Review 7 (April 22, 1925),2.
108 The September 8, 1924, Review is the first mention of cooperation that was not in one of
Grace's letters. This was a short outline of cooperation with the government at Bethlehem Steel.
109 Eugene G. Grace, "Employees' Third Savings and Stock Ownership Plan," The Bethlehem
Review 10 (February 1,1926),1.
110 Eugene G. Grace, "Modern Management," The Bethlehem Review 12 (October 15, 1926), 1.
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company. In this manner, Bethlehem employees received a "voice with that of
management in the consideration of all questions relating to rates of pay and working
conditions."]]]
Twelve years later in 1938 Grace continued to discuss the importance of
cooperation between labor and management. Addressing the uncertainty caused by the
Great Depression, Grace stated that "when we run into bad times, cooperative
relationships and daily contact between employees and management are required if the
needs of employees and their families are to be best served."] 12 He continued that the
only way Bethlehem Steel had survived was because of the cooperation between
everyone involved with the company. Undoubtedly, an outside labor union would
seriously threaten such cooperation. Grace foreshadowed what would occur if this
cooperation ever ceases at Bethlehem. Put simply, "It will be a sorry day for this
country, if that relationship ever is permitted to be undermined.,,]]3 All in all, Grace
mentioned cooperation in nineteen of his introductory letters throughout the time period
of this study, indicating that Grace continually attempted to reiterate the importance of
cooperation.
As an integral part of cooperation, collective bargaining lies at the core of
meaningful labor relations. In the 1920s and 1930s, collective bargaining was not new.
In fact, Grace contended that Bethlehem Steel was also a pioneer in the practice of
III Grace, "New Benefits for Employees," contained in National Labor Relations Board, II/ the
Matter ojBETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORA TION, 21. The aforementioned statement appeared in a
leaflet, "New Benefits of Employees," distributed to the employees of McClintinc-Marshall shortly after
Bethlehem Steel assumed control. Here, Grace gave these new workers the impression that they had a say
in their workplace. It was now vital for employees to cooperate with management since they were
dependent on one another.
112 Eugene G. Grace, "Our Labor Situation," The Bethlehem Review 32 (January 15,1938),1.
113 Ibid.
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collective bargaining. This no doubt was a result of the 1918 government mandate to
create a plan for bargaining. According to Grace "real collective bargaining must
achieve a definite goal, and that goal must be to elevate the working and living standards
of the employees.,,114 Real collective bargaining must entail an honest and frank
discussion in which both sides work to reach an acceptable compromise. Thus, as
journalist Louis Stark reported in 1936, "genuine collective bargaining is not carried on
in the steel industry under company unions [or ERPs] because it takes two to make a
bargain, and with the steel industry the bargain begins and ends with one person.,,115 At
Bethlehem this was Eugene Grace.
Although the Bethlehem Plan did achieve some benefits for labor, such gains
often took the form of "new toilet seats, or new sink bowls ...but on real issues [rates of
pay]; they were always talked down at the meetings.,,116 According to an increasing
number of laborers throughout the late 1920s and especially after the passage of the
NIRA and the Wagner Act, the only groups that could bargain effectively and make
progress on substantive issues such as pay rates and hours worked were independent
labor unions. Although new toilets and sinks were appreciated, they did not help labor
economically. During an economic depression, pay was paramount to labor. One of the
major purposes of the Wagner Act was in fact to create better relations between labor and
114 Eugene G. Grace, "Time Are Better," The Bethlehem Review 31 (March 1937), 2.
115 Louis Stark, "Steel and the Unions Join the Issue," The New York Times 5 July 1936, E6.
116 Roger Simon, "Looking Backward at Steel," The Antioch Review 36, no. 4 (1978),455.
Minutes from the Standing Committees of Employees' Representatives at the Cambria and the Jo1mstown
Plants of Bethlehem Steel support this assertion. In the minutes, the committees dealt with accident
prevention, safety equipment and procedures, health issues, and employee parking, without mentioning
rates of payor hours worked. See Minutes ofSpecial Meeting ofNo.1 Standing Committee - Rules, etc.,
Plan ofEmployees' Representation at the Cambria Plant ofBethlehem Steel Company, Gautier Safety
Meeting, Bethleh~m Steel Company---Johnstown, by T. Kern (April 28, 1937), (photocopies), Howard
Truman Curtiss Papers.
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management. ll7 By seeking what they saw as overdue gains for workers, labor leaders
and unions bargained for advances unattainable by employee representatives functioning
under ERPs. Herein lies the threat to Eugene Grace and other steel executives.
Throughout his Review letters Grace reiterated not only the importance of
working together as management and employees, but also cooperating with the
government. 118 Bethlehem Steel was an important manufacturer of defense material.
More often than not, such cooperation focused on preventing strikes or work stoppages.
In addition to disrupting production ofBethlehem and the overall economy of the nation,
strikes also raised fears of revolution. Americans needed to look no further than to the
events of Russia in 1917 to witness the great upheaval caused by workers. This caused
many in America to view labor unrest and strikes "as the cutting edge of domestic
revolution, not just as an expression ofjustified ...workers' grievances."ll9 It was anti-
American to strike or stop work at any company throughout the country especially during
wartime production. The Bethlehem ERP, according to Grace, presented a good,
American alternative to disruptive labor unions.
To fend off notions of a labor revolution, Grace utilized patriotic tones in his
pieces that he wrote for the Review. During the existence of the ERP patriotism ran high
in every aspect of American life; therefore, Grace used patriotism to defend the ERP.
The laborer had to do what was right for America, not just himself, when choosing to
back the ERP over an independent labor union. Mainly, what was right for America, as
117 Second Annual Report ofthe National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C: United
States Government Printing Office, 4. Senator Robert F Wagner's legislation intended to close the
loopholes of the aforementioned section 7(a). Such discrepancies allowed management to refuse to
bargain with outside labor unions. For a complete discussion, see Dubofsky and Dulles, pg. 259.
118 Eugene G. Grace, The Bethlehem Review 3 (September 8,1924),1.
119 Dubofsky, 216.
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maintained by Grace, was acceptance of the Bethlehem Plan. With war threatening in
Europe in March 1939, Grace wrote, "I know that you as Americans, with the interest of
our country and our families at heart, will join me in pledging the utmost to what-ever
job we may be called upon to do in the interest of the general welfare.,,120 Moreover,
anything that disrupted the relations and the communication between labor and
management also disrupted America as a whole. In the same manner, such close
relations provided workers with "one of the best ways for us to cooperate with our
government.,,121 Unions stood to break such relationships.
When World War II erupted in Europe, Grace continued to trumpet patriotism in
many of his Review articles. Without any real conflict, talk of patriotism appeared
superficial. Now, with World War II ravishing Europe, Grace had a specific reason to
incorporate patriotism. For instance, in his August 1940, letter "We Must All Do Our
Part," Grace deliberately stated that "No true patriot will seek to enhance his position at
the cost of national need and national welfare.,,122 Consequently, it behooved the
Bethlehem labor force not to join unions, as it was seemingly analogous to opposing
one's government. In the March 1941 edition of the Review, Grace, in a letter entitled
"Our Imperative Task," stated that "because the paramount factor in national defense is
to keep production flowing, anyone who supports the philosophy of work stoppages is
hampering national defense.,,123 Workers should not even be tempted to join a union
because they were, according to the steel industry, such disruptive forces.
\20 Eugene G. Grace, "Let's Keep on An Even Keel," The Bethlehem Review 36 (December
1939),3.
\2\ Grace, "Bethlehem's Labor Policies," The Bethlehem Review 26 (July 25,1934), 1.
\22 Grace, "We Must All Do Out Part," Bethlehem Review 38 (August 1940),3.
\23 Grace, ·'Our Imperative Task," Bethlehem Review 39 (March 1941),3.
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On more than one occasion between 1924 and 1941, Eugene Grace also heralded
the advantages of the Bethlehem Plan over that of an independent labor union. Often,
this was done as he incorporated other themes, such as patriotism, in his articles. At
times, such statements were subtle; at other times Grace blatantly denounced unions. In
a 1933 letter, Grace focused on the relationship between management and labor under the
ERP: "NO [original emphasis] outside agency could possibly take the place of our
ERP," without destroying the close contact that was responsible for the good working
and living conditions the workers experienced. 124 No person wants to hear about
impending turmoil if changes to the status quo occur, especially during the hard
economic times of the Great Depression. Grace purposely played to the fear of economic
distress and publicized the ERP as the only viable option duril1g this period. In his
March 5, 1938, letter, "An Achievement in Human Relations," as the country still
struggled with the Depression, he claimed, "our management believes that it cannot shift
this responsibility [relations with employees] to the shoulders of anyone else, and that
others cannot effectively assume it.,,125 As workers throughout the steel industry began
to turn their attention to outside unions, Grace clearly went on the offensive in his letter.
The tone of this letter makes it appear that the management is simply looking out for the
common laborer against the large, impersonal labor unions. Clearly, in Grace's eyes, the
Bethlehem ERP was better suited for the employee as it was solely devoted to the
Bethlehem Steel workforce and not steel workers throughout the country. Thus, as David
124 Eugene G. Grace, "Fifteen Years of Employee Representation," The Bethlehem Review 25
(September 25, 1933), 1.
125 Eugene G. Grace, "An Achievement in Human Relations," The Bethlehem Review 33 (March
5, 1938),2. Grace's letter for this issue, where he again defended the Bethlehem ERP was rather long.
The letter was formatted into two columns, an increase from the usual one column letter.
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Brody accurately stated, ERP programs illustrated that "management accepted an
obligation for the well-being of its employees.,,126 The sentiment expressed in the letter
is that outside unions will not work at Bethlehem because they will not provide the
requisite services that the Bethlehem labor force needed during economic hard times.
Grace directly denounced labor unions, making it obvious that in the opinion of the
management there was no place for any outside agency or independent labor union at any
of the Bethlehem Steel plants. While some may argue that Grace was simply looking out
for the best interests oflabor, given other statements in the Review, the anti-union
position ofBethlehem Steel is evident.
,
Examples of welfare capitalism were also included in Grace's opening letters.
Executives utilized these concessions to labor to "discourage trade unionism by making
working conditions so favorable that the workers would no longer consider unions of any
value, at the same time increasing production and industrial efficiency through closer
labor-management cooperation.,,127 Thus, employees would rather maintain the status
quo as created by company unions and ERPs.
Grace also devoted space in his opening letters and other articles in the Review to
document improvements throughout Bethlehem Steel plants. For instance, the
December, 1939, article "Accent on Sanitation, Safety, and Health" reminded the laborer
that Bethlehem Steel, despite poor business conditions, created locker rooms and wash
rooms in its construction of new plants and its remodeling of older plants. 128 Essentially,
Grace reminded his labor force that in spite of economic uncertainty Bethlehem Steel
126 Dubofsky and Dulles, 239.
127 Ibid., 235.
128 Bethlehem Steel Corporation, "Accent on Sanitation, Safety, and Health," The Bethlehem
Review 36 (December 1939), 11.
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still placed the welfare of the employee first.
Many of Grace's opening letters and entire issues of the Review dealt with the
important topic of the Employee Saving and Stock Ownership Plans. Grace dealt with
this plan on ten separate occasions. This is a prime example of welfare capitalism used
throughout the steel industry. Such plans allowed the employee to buy stock in the
corporation. Since many employees took advantage ofthis plan, it suddenly was in their
best interest to avoid any and all work stoppages as even the smallest disruption of
production hurt Bethlehem economically. Companies throughout the steel industry
adopted such measures to aid the success of the company unions or ERPs and also to win
over the employees. 129 This is another instance of the corporation making it economically
advantageous for workers to keep peace at Bethlehem Steel and not join an outside labor
union. As Grace claimed on March 5, 1938, "the interests of capital and labor are not
opposed but are mutually interdependent, and that recognition of this relationship is the
only firm foundation for growth and prosperity."130 This quote essentially puts
management and labor, specifically those who took advantage of the Saving and Stock
Ownership Plan, on the same footing. Not only did work stoppages caused by agitation
or strikes caused by outside labor unions affect management, it also stood to
economically harm a significant number of Bethlehem Steel employees, especially as
many lost eVerything that they owned. This is an obvious instance of Eugene Grace
129 Dubofsky and Dulles, Labor in America, 236. Dubofsky discusses numerous examples of
measures that companies adopted to please their workforce. Such things included: profit-sharing plans,
bonuses/stock ownership, old-age pension plans, clinics, and lunchrooms. Many of these same items
appeared at Bethlehem as a result of the ERP activities. All of these plans were designed to create
"goodwill and friendly human contracts between labor and management." See page 236 for the complete
discussion of such plans:
130 Eugene G. Grace, "An Achievement in Human Relations," 2.
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using financial uncertainty during the Great Depression to direct attention from an
outside labor union and onto the Bethlehem ERP.
In a similar manner, Grace always mentioned the Bethlehem Steel workforce in
his introductory letters. In the July 6, 1927, Review his letter touched upon "The Human
Side of Our Affairs." Grace mentioned the progress made in the relations between labor
and management. Such progress was essential to "the forward looking labor policy
which Bethlehem...established in cooperation with its employees.,,]3! Grace's continual
discussion of cooperation suggests that not all of the Bethlehem Steel employees bought
into the ERP. As a result, Grace needed to win over these holdouts, getting them to
follow the Bethlehem Plan. Furthermore, Grace continually repeated the revolutionary
nature of the plan. In a later issue, Graced mentioned that "this happy outlook is due
largely to our persistent adherence to the principle of good management which
recognizes above anything else that a cooperative relationship between employer and
employee is essential to the success of any large industrial undertaking.,,132 Such
statements purposefully did not take into account the dissatisfaction of employees
throughout the steel industry who desired to be represented by independent labor unions
free from the control of anyone particular corporation.
Some of Grace's most blatant anti-union, pro-Bethlehem Plan rhetoric appeared
in his September 25, 1933, introductory letter. This issue, marking the fifteenth
anniversary of The Bethlehem Plan and appearing after the passage of the NIRA,
heralded every aspect of the ERP. In doing so, Grace claimed that the NIRA valued the
impOliance of an ERP such as the Bethlehem Plan in its provision for collective
131 Grace, "The Human Side of Om Affairs," The Bethlehem Review 14 (July 6,1927),1.
132 Grace, "Bethlehem Moves Forward," The Bethlehem Review 20 (August 6, 1929), 1.
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bargaining. 133 The NIRA, specifically Section 7(a), however, established that
"employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or
coercion of employers of labor.,,134 This act caused employers to initiate ERPs or
company unions because they were the better alternative to allowing labor to unionize on
an industry-wide basis. Thus, Section 7(a) caused more company unions to appear in
industry almost immediately.
After the approval of Section 7(a), ERPs consistently and almost immediately
caused controversy. Since specific companies sponsored them, labor increasingly voiced
its discontent with these plans. Labor claimed that by sponsoring the ERPs or company
unions, management directly interfered with and refused to recognize any other
bargaining groups. In this sense, management directly violated the last portion of
Section 7(a) concerning employer interference. Since the Bethlehem ERP was
administered by company executives, they certainly interfered with the bargaining group.
Although the NIRA, including Section 7(a), was later ruled unconstitutional, union
leaders interpreted the section as an affirmation from the government of the right to
bargain collectively. 135 Thus, in the eyes oflabor, management was violating the law. In
this September 1933 letter Grace argued that the ERP was a fine way of fulfilling Section
7(a)'s requirements. It is interesting to note that the September 25, 1933, edition utilized
133 Grace, "Fifteen Years of Employee Representation," 1.
134 National Industrial RecovelY Act, Statutes at Large 90, sec. 7, 198 (1933). Although the
NIRA attempted to stimulate economic recovery and was ultimately found unconstitutional, it was a major
victory for labor. It set important collective bargaining precedents that were later revitalized through the
Wagner Act. See also, National Industrial Conference Board, Collective Bargaining Through Employee
Representation, v.
135 .Iron Age 133, no. 1 (January 4, 1934),34.
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the smallest type-face for Grace's letter and focused solely on employees' representation.
In one of his most misleading passages from the September 1933 letter, Grace
further attempted to justify the Bethlehem ERP under the NlRA. According to him, the
NIRA "recognizes the value of such a plan under its provision for collective bargaining.
This means of collective bargaining has stood the test of time...and meets the
requirements of the new law.,,136 As Grace saw it, the NIRA called for ERPs and not
independent labor unions. Management throughout the steel industry felt that ERPs
provided sufficient forms of collective bargaining because of the presence of employee
representatives to deal with grievances. To them, this was not employer interference, but
rather another example ofthe employer cooperating with his employee. While president
of the AISI, Grace provided that "if allowed to act without interference or coercion on
either side, employees will choose for themselves the kind of organization or
representation they want. That is as it should be.,,137 What is ironic is that Grace
continually interfered and coerced labor through his actions to keep labor unions out of
Bethlehem Steel. To Grace, since employees participated in the Bethlehem ERP, that
was evidence that they accepted the plan. In reality, labor did not have a choice ofwhat
plan they wanted until the government later became involved.
Throughout the mid-1930s Grace continued to focus on the positive aspects of the
ERP in his introductory letters. For instance, in 1935 an "Annual Summary of Employee
Representation Activities" appeared as the feature for the edition. This was the first such
summary of employee representation activities. The intent of this edition was to
136 Grace, "Fifteen Years of Employee Representation," I.
137 Eugene Grace, "Address of the President," Year Book ofthe American Iron and Steel Institute
(New York: American Iron arId Steel Institute, 1937),34.
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highlight the success ofthe ERP, especially in terms of how many cases had ended
favorably for labor. Also during this period more of the headlines throughout the entire
Review focused on employee representation activities. For instance, the February 20,
1935, edition of the Review contained an article titled "Employees' Representation Plans
Stand Test.,,138 What at one time received only minimal attention from Grace now
became the focus of the Review. Topics such as employee representation elections and
the highlights of the representation plan now became the center of the publication. Prior
to this period, the Review focused significantly on the Employee Savings Plan. Now,
however, as labor organizing at Bethlehem intensified, the Review suddenly became an
anti-union document.
In his letters, Grace also focused on the extent to which Bethlehem Steel aided its
workforce during the Great Depression. He reiterated that Bethlehem Steel was doing all
that it could to maintain work for as many men as possible. Grace credited the ERP for
keeping employees' employment needs constantly before management. 139 As a result,
management moved shifts and hours to keep the maximum number of people working.
Grace also reiterated during this period that labor disruptions were impermissible.
Continuing with the notion of cooperation, Grace said that sticking with the ERP was the
best way to help the government through this terrible time. Workers striking for
economic gains was not permissible. Grace threatened that there were no guarantees that
employment levels would remain the same if a union were introduced at Bethlehem
138 Bethlehem Steel Corporation, "Employees' Representation Plans Stand Test," Bethlehem
Review 27 (February 20, 1935),3. This article claimed that the ERP created "effective agencies for
collective bargaining." It also pointed out the fact that the ERP handled 814 cases during the year. This is
good affirmation for Grace that the ERP was serving the needs of the labor force better than any outside
union ever could.
139 Grace, '''Bethlehem's Labor Policies," 1.
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Steel. In Grace's eyes, any gains achieved by a union would hurt the company's finances
and would directly harm the worker during the Depression. Grace tied together
acceptance of the Bethlehem ERP, patriotism, and the Great Depression together.
In addition to focusing on aid during the Great Depression, Grace consistently
constructed misleading arguments concerning the aforementioned open-shop/closed-shop
philosophies while using the NIRA as justification for the Bethlehem Plan. For example,
Grace stated that "no Bethlehem employee... [was] required to belong to a labor union to
get the full advantages of collective bargaining under the National Industrial Recovery
ACt.,,140 Bethlehem employees need not look any further than the ERP to obtain all of
the provisions of the NIRA. Grace, however, neglected to mention that while the
Bethlehem Plan allowed the employees to choose their representatives, the final say in all
matters rested with the mamigement or an arbitrator handpicked by management. Often
times, the open shop policy also allowed for discrimination against union members and a
blatant refusal to deal with such members collectively regardless of their numbers. 141
While asserting the so-called advantages of the Bethlehem Plan and continually
stating the advantages of the open-shop policy, Grace portrayed labor leaders and labor
unions in a negative light. Steel executives throughout the United States often portrayed
labor leaders as Bolsheviks. 142 From 1933 to 1938, Grace used language designed to
scare workers into following the Bethlehem Plan. On various occasions he stated that the
welfare of the workers depended on continued, uninterrupted production at Bethlehem
Steel. Organizing campaigns by the SWOC stood to hurt everyone at Bethlehem Steel.
140 Grace, "Fifteen Years of Employee Representation," 1.
141 Dubofsky and Dulles, 231. As Dubofsky correctly states, "the open shop thus became more
than ever a recognized technique to deny the whole process of collective bargaining."
142 Ibid, 232.
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In his July 3,1936, letter, "Security of Employment," Grace dealt with the topic of
professional labor leaders. For the first time, Grace mentioned the campaign by such
leaders to unionize the steel industry. Grace again played to the Depression by
mentioning the dues laborers paId for union membership. Conversely, the senior
management of Bethlehem contended "that no worker should be required to pay tribute
to anyone or to any organization for the right to work.,,143 This "tribute" clearly referred
to the required union dues. After all, the Bethlehem ERP did not require labor to pay
dues. This in and of itself should make the Bethlehem ERP more appealing to any
worker.
Finally, Grace claimed that Bethlehem Steel would protect the employees from
the disruptive influence of unions. To do so, "we will use our resources to the best of our
ability to protect you and your families from interference, intimidation, and any coercion
from any source," referring to union organizing efforts. 144 Grace began this letter, "I am
sure we all agree that your welfare and that of your families ...depends upon
uninterrupted operation of our plants.,,145 According to Grace, if unions represented the
workforce strikes would occur. Strikes shut down plants and prevented the workers from
earning wages. In the next line, Grace mentioned the campaign by professional labor
leaders to unionize the steel industry. Essentially, Grace and the management of
Bethlehem Steel relied upon scare tactics, which centered on the families of the workers,
to maintain support for the ERP at Bethlehem. .
An advertisement by the American Iron and Steel Institute in the same 1936




edition of the Review reinforced Grace's argument concerning labor leaders and unions.
In its simplest form, this advertisement defended the open-shop policy strongly accepted
by steel executives across America. This is the same group to which Grace spoke of the
open-shop policy on many occasions. In his letter, Grace stated that management
strongly followed the sentiments expressed in this advertisement. The ad dealt with the
announced campaign to unionize the entire steel industry. It stated, "The Steel Industry
believes in the principles of collective bargaining" through ERPs established under the
auspices of steel executives such as Eugene Grace. 146 This advertisement was addressed
not only to steelworkers, but the public in general. In words similar to Grace's, the ad
claimed that the entire steel industry would use its resources to protect its employees and
their families again trumpeting the paternalistic tone of ERPs. The advertisement also
claimed that "There are many disturbing indications that the promoters of the campaign
will employ coercion and intimidation of the employees in the Industry and foment
strikes.,,147 The inclusion of the advertisement in this anti-union issue demonstrates the
extent to which Eugene Grace and the management of Bethlehem Steel worked to
prevent the unionization of any of Bethlehem's plants. Echoing Grace's arguments, this
advertisement also stated, "Any interruption of the forward movement will seriously
injure the employees and their families and all businesses dependent upon the Industry,
and will endanger the welfare of the country.,,148 When this advertisement appeared in
the Review in 1936, Eugene Grace was president of the AISI. In this issue, instead of
providing the employees with news of what was occurring at Bethlehem and throughout
146 American Iron and Steel Institute, "To The Public and The Employees in the Steel Industry,"




the steel industry during such hard economic times, the Review engaged in a one-sided
attacked on labors unions, only taking into consideration the viewpoints of management
and the AISI in general.
In addition to the overall length of the Review, the length of Grace's opening
letters serves as a rather obvious indication of the growing discontent with the ERP. As
previously mentioned, the first letter in 1924 was only a few paragraphs in length,
staying this length for nine years, until 1933. With the country in the midst of a severe
economic depression, and labor discontent on the rise, the font of the letters decreased
and the
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Figure 5. This is the cover to the The Bethlehem Review 25 (September 25, 1933). Pay close attention to
the increased length and decreased typeset of the letter. Also noteworthy is the Blue Eagle in the upper
left-hand comer. This symbol appeared on all of the issues during the Depression period.
length of the letters increased (see Figure 5). Although Grace dealt with emplOYment
concerns, there is another reason for the increase in the length of the letters from 1933 to
1941. Largely because of the pro-labor New Deal legislation, the NIRA and later the
Wagner Act, labor now had legislation to help provide for effective, independent
collective bargaining that did not fall under the control of corporations or employer
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associations. One of Grace's longest letters appeared on January 15, 1938. This letter
was simply titled "Our Labor Situation." During the New Deal five out of Grace's seven
letters dealt with either the employment situation at Bethlehem Steel or the Bethlehem
ERP. As a result, Grace assumed a defensive position regarding labor unions, resulting
in longer and more strident letters, thus further preventing the Review from bringing the
employees of Bethlehem Steel news (see Figure 6).
BETHLEHEM REVIEW
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Our Labor Situation
Figure 6. This is one of the longest letters by Grace during the period of this study. Notice the use of
three columns and the decreased type-set. This letter, "Our Labor Situation," focused on the ERP at
Bethlehem as labor discontent reached an all-time high. This image is taken from the January 15, 1938,
edition of the Review.
It was also important that Eugene Grace maintain a positive image with the public
as the unionization campaign spread across the country. He could not afford to have the
general public, those who were not directly involved with either Bethlehem Steel or the
steel industry, take a stand against him. One particular issue on November 1, 1938,
Grace focused on "Bethlehem and the Public." Bethlehem Steel stood as a centerpiece in
many communities, specifically Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. Grace explained, "This issue
of the Review pres.ents some of the things which the management and the employees
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have accomplished in making our company of outstanding service to the general
public.,,149 Therefore, it behooved management to win-over the good graces of the
citizens from each community. The public, according to Grace, also had an interest in
the industry and that required them to be apprised of the operations at Bethlehem. 150
One such headline in this issue was "Our Part in Community Life" that stated that
the company had "a responsibility to the community has always been recognized by the
Bethlehem Steel organization, both management and employees.,,151 As a pillar in the
community, Bethlehem Steel had to create civic programs to benefit the entire
community. Not only is this good public relations, it too directly benefited the labor
force. Additionally, part of this civic responsibility was fair dealings with labor. Grace
stated that "fair dealings have always been an essential part of our policy as we have
been engaged in the continuous development of Bethlehem.,,152 As early as 1927 Grace
claimed that "the day of the driver, of the strong-arm boss, has given way to leadership
which guides and inspires."153 Such leadership included active participation in
community life, as opposed to the sweat-shops of the nineteenth century that showed no
regard for the workforce or community in general. In this sense, Bethlehem Steel stood
as a source of progressive community relations. Since a large majority of the labor force
lived in the plant communities, animosity between the management and the community
would spill over into the plant.
\49 Eugene G. Grace, "Bethlehem and the Public," The Bethlehem Review 34 (November 1,
1938), 1.
\50 Ibid.
\5\ Bethlehem Steel Corporation, "Our Part in Community Life," Bethlehem Review 34
(November 1, 1938), 8. Interestingly, this issue was eleven pages in length. It also contained nine
photographs of the growth of Bethlehem Steel and it's involvement in the communities.
\52 Ibid., 2.
\53 Eugene G. Grace, "Foremanship in Industry," The Bethlehem Review 14 (July 6, 1927),4.
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During 1939, as labor discontent grew, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) heard a case that dealt with the Bethlehem ERP. After U.S. Steel unionized in
1937, the labor force at Bethlehem increasingly responded to the SWOc. In this case,
the NLRB found that Bethlehem unfairly promoted its ERP. Without a doubt, the
Review played a significant role in this promotion. Finally, the board ordered Bethlehem
to stop using the ERP in labor relations. 154 Specifically, the NLRB ruled that Bethlehem
Steel "engaged in unfair labor practices" and ultimately "dominated and interfered with
the administration of the Plans [ERP] and have contributed support thereto.,,155 This was
a direct violation of the Wagner Act.
When the NLRB cited the interference of Bethlehem Steel with the ERP, it
clearly indicted the Review, the "house organ, over the signature of E.G. Grace.,,156 To
labor and its leaders, such a ruling was a foregone conclusion, albeit long overdue, since
Grace and his management team administered and ran the ERP. The NLRB ruled that if
the ERP continued to exist, it would prevent the employees from exercising their right to
self-organization and collective bargaining through representatives of their own
choosing. Furthermore, the NLRB also concluded, "these plans were in fact designed to
forestall organization of the Bethlehem corporation's employes [sic] by labor unions.,,157
In the final blow to the Bethlehem Plan, the NLRB ordered Bethlehem Steel to
154 Kathleen Purcell Munley, "Shopfloor Memories of Organizing Bethlehem Steel," Labor's
Heritage 9, no. 4 (1998): 76.
155 National Labor Relations Board, In the Matter ofBETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION, 75.
This case summary provides an excellent account of the labor struggle at Bethlehem Steel beginning in
1918 and culminating with this NLRB ruling.
156 "Labor Board Bars Bethlehem," Special to the New York Times, 1.
157 Ibid.
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"withdraw all recognition from the Plans as representatives of the employees.,,158 Thus,
Bethlehem grudgingly succumbed to allow union organizing after "years of persistent
organization and the pressure of sanctions under the National Labor Relations ACt.,,159
Tellingly, the Review and Eugene Grace never mentioned that the case was on the
docket of the NLRB. In fact, there was only minimal coverage of the case in the January
15, 1938, issue of the Review (see Figure 7) .160 Grace only gave the employees a slight
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Figure 7. This is the article that covered Bethlehem Steel's case before the NLRB. Notice that this article
is only four paragraphs long. Furthermore, the article does not go into any specific details concerning the
case.
indication of what was happening between Bethlehem Steel and the NLRB. His
comments amounted to only one paragraph in a long letter. Grace claimed:
For the last several months that long-established method of dealing with you has
been the subject of hearings before the National Labor Relations Board. The
Company is defending itself, and at considerable expense, against what we
believe to be an unfounded charge, made by the Steel Workers Organizing
158 National Labor Relations Board, In the Matter ofBETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORA TION, 75-
76. As a precedent and as the basis for their ruling in the Bethlehem case, the NLRB used the case of
National Labor Relations Board v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc.
159 Tilove, 5.
160 "Bethlehem's Side Now to be Heard in Labor Board Case: Hoyt A. Moore Chief Counsel for
Company-Representation Plans also Employ Counsel to Defend their Interests," The Bethlehem Review
32 (January 15, 1938),7.
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Committee, that the Company is dominating your collective bargaining Plans. It
is regrettable that your plans are being put to like expense in defending at those
hearings their independence and the type of collective bargaining which has been
in effect under them for many years. 161
For such an important case to the future of the ERP and Bethlehem Steel, Grace certainly
does not devote much attention to the matter. Grace put all ofthe blame for this case on
the NLRB and the SWOc. His use of the words "long-established" and "regrettable" is
clear evidence that he is trying to play to the loyalties ofhis workforce at Bethlehem by
convincing them that the ERP has stood the test of time and should not be changed. A
few paragraphs later, Grace attempted to downplay the alleged domination by
Bethlehem. To him:
We have always believed that the best labor relations will be had only when the
representatives of employees and management negotiate on a basis that
contemplates a will to be fair and just in the consideration of each other's
problems. There is no room for domination in following that policy. In fact it is
the very lack of domination in such a relationship that assures mutually
satisfactory results. 162
To Grace, the fact that the ERP had worked since 1918 stood as evidence that all parties
were happy. Obviously, the NLRB and a significant portion of the Bethlehem labor
force disagreed with Grace. By not mentioning the defeat of the case and essentially
giving one last defense of the ERP, Grace clung to the hope of resisting the acceptance of
an independent labor union.
What is more, there was a two-year period between the time ofthe NLRB's
ruling in favor oflabor and the fonnal recognition of the United Steel Workers of
America (USWA) at Bethlehem as the official bargaining unit. In the months leading up
161 Grace, "Our Labor Situation," 1.
162 Ibid. .
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to the formal recognition of the USWA, Clinton S. Golden, regional director of the
SWOC, alleged that Grace and the senior management of Bethlehem Steel "disappeared
when union representatives called on them" while the management of Bethlehem
"discourage[d] Bethlehem employees" from membership in the union. 163 All of this
occurred as Grace continually claimed that workers were free to belong to any group that
they wished. As can be expected from Grace and the management of Bethlehem, the
company, in spite of the NLRB's ruling, did not accept unionization and appealed the
NLRB's decision. 164 By resisting the organizing efforts of the USWA, Grace defied
orders of the federal government; this type of action was something that he specifically
condemned in earlier issues of the Review. Remember, when the corporation needed
cooperation, Grace essentially ordered it from his labor force and devoted entire issues of
the company newsletter to this simple topic. Now, however, as this NLRB ruling did not
fit into Grace's labor doctrine, cooperation on his part and on the part of the corporation
was not necessary. Clearly, Grace held a double standard for acceptable behavior on the
part of management and of labor.
163 "Renews Demand On Grace," The New York Times 19 November 1939,2.
1M Munley, "Shop floor Memories of Organizing Bethlehem Steel," 80. This article recounts in
specific detail the uphill battle on the part of labor to unionize Bethlehem and formally recognize the
USWA as the official bargaining unit at Bethlehem.
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Conclusions
During the mid-1930s, gaining momentum with the "Little Steel" strike of 1937,
and finally culminating with the Bethlehem Steel strike of 1941, the SWOC of the
Congress ofIndustrial Organizations (CIO) continually attempted to unionize'Bethlehem
Steel. During the strike of March 1941, "Bethlehem Steel bore the brunt of the labor
challenge" since the SWOC brought 19,000 workers out of the Bethlehem, Pennsylvania
plant to protest the Bethlehem ERP.165 This event not only had national implications, it
essentially was the last stand for the Bethlehem ERP and a huge defeat for Eugene Grace.
When the employees of Bethlehem voted in favor of the USWA as their form of
representation after the 1941 strike, a new era began in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. 166 The
ERP no longer represented the workforce of Bethlehem Steel. In marking defeat, the
Review and Eugene Grace made little mention of this strike. Instead of trumpeting the
advantages of the ERP, the Review now served as a true company newsletter, outlining
accident prevention and advances, both physical and technological at all of the
Bethlehem Steel plants. Moreover, the Review now served as a tool to help maintain
good relations with labor. With the ERP defunct, the Review truly was a company
newsletter without any ulterior motives. Also, the workforce was now represented by a
bargaining organization with substantial power; one that was free from the influence of
any steel company or steel executives. Furthermore, the Review could go back to its
165 Zieger, 65. During this sJike, Bethlehem Steel executives used intimidation and police force
to stop the recognition of the SWOc. This practice did not work. After the NLRB elections at Bethlehem,
"over 21,500 of the company's 28,500 employees chose the SWOC, solidifying the CIO in one of Little
Steel's largest firms," See Zieger, pages 64-66 for an adequate discussion of the introduction of the
SWOC at Bethlehem Steel and the entire Little Steel corporations.
166 Munley, 74.
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original purpose of spreading company news to the employees.
The influence of Eugene Grace over Bethlehem Steel is undeniable. It is very
easy after reading his passages in the Review to hold Eugene Grace in a negative, almost
damning light. However, to not properly credit Grace for his success at Bethlehem Steel
specifically and throughout the entire steel industry in general would be unfair. This
legendary man helped Bethlehem rise to prominence. He transformed it into a major
supplier of structural steel for countless United States cities and also played an important
role in World War II armaments. In doing so, however, Grace created, as Harold J.
Ruttenberg claimed, "The Bethlehem Psychology," where management was "blind to
everything except Bethlehem's self-interest.,,167
At Bethlehem, unions took control of the workforce away from management,
giving labor more benefits and more of a voice in the corporation. While the argument
could be made that Eugene Grace and the board of directors of Bethlehem Steel simply
followed the rest of the steel industry when creating their ERP, the legacy that Grace left
behind in his letters in the Review and speeches to steel industry executives provide
evidence to the contrary. Grace and his executives fought passionately against the
unionization of Bethlehem Steel, instead opting for the open shop policy and the
Bethlehem Plan of Employees' Representation. Grace also played to American's fears to
create a foreboding picture of the situation that unions created in industry. Only a
government ruling from the NLRB allowed the introduction of an outside labor union
into the workplace at Bethlehem Steel.
167 Ruttenberg, "The Bethlehem Psychology," 4. Mr. Ruttenberg served as the Assistant to the
Director of the Steel Division of the War Production Board and also served as the Research Director of the
United Steelworkers'of America.
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In the larger scope oflabor history, a continual battle for power exists to this day
between labor and management. As was the case at Bethlehem, the union strove to
organize the workforce, thereby increasing the power of the workingman in spite of the
ERP and company policies created in response to such attempts. When the USWA
became the official bargaining unit for the Bethlehem labor force, a significant amount of
power slipped away from the management and more specifically Eugene Grace. The
Review presented one side to this lengthy battIe for control that occurred at Bethlehem.
As demonstrated, this publication, specifically the letters and writings of Eugene Grace
as well as his speeches to the AISI, became inflammatory and manipulative as unions
spread throughout the country and as the New Deal legislation granted labor the right to
organize and bargain collectively. Thus, Grace used the Review to retain control of the
Bethlehem Steel workforce and to impede the progress of the unionization campaign into
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